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Structure, Dynamics, Implications of 1992 Economy
1. Mozambique's economy is characterised by very low levels of output per
capita (under $100) and very high levels of absolute poverty (about 65%
pre-drought). It is also characterised by high (20% to 40%) rates of 
price increase despite stringent credit ceilings and negligible 
government domestic borrowing and by under-utilisation of both urban 
(including manufacturing) and of rural production capacity related to 
inadequate demand, and to lack of credit for normal commercial
activities as well as import constraints and insecurity.
2. These characteristics have been largely caused by the war and by the 
terrorist strategy employed by Renamo and are now gravely exacerbated 
by the drought. However, the running down of insecurity and of the war 
will not by themselves readily or speedily restore an overall forward 
momentum to the national economy. Still less will it directly reduce 
absolute poverty. Indeed demobilisation and reduction of Emergencia 
survival support, taken alone, could further deflate the economy and 
increase both absolute poverty and absolute destitution.
3. The reasons are sixfold:
a. about 1,000,000 sector familial households (7,000,000 persons or 
about two-thirds of the rural population including refugees) have 
had their livelihoods wiped out and cannot rebuild them on their 
own;
b. perhaps 100,000 urban households (largely with mixed low formal 
wage plus informal wage and self-employment income sources) are 
absolutely poor because of low demand, low government revenue and 
real wages below $30 a month (MT 70,000 as of May 1992) and cannot 
respond to incentives (except, ominously, by lowering real
2productivity as real wages fall) nor contribute to reviving 
aggregate demand;
c. public services are badly debilitated because fiscal constraints do 
not allow extension to growing urban and accessible rural 
populations, adequate maintenance nor paying efficiency wages (say 
$50 to $750 a month) necessary for raising morale and productivity 
as well as for making remedial and upgrading training an attractive 
use of public servants' time;
d. in the context of "a" and "b" the gap between minimum efficient 
basic services costs and fiscal resources cannot be closed by user 
charges because over 8,000,000 persons (50% plus of the population 
including refugees) cannot pay now and, without livelihood 
rehabilitation, will remain unable to pay for the foreseeable 
future;
e. basic rural and urban infrastructure , not least rural and small 
town commercial infrastructure is so badly debilitated as to 
cripple price incentives for enhanced production either because 
effective market access is absent, oligopsony is pervasive, 
transport costs are cripplingly high or the infrastructural gaps 
literally prevent restoration of production and services. Normal 
infrastructural investment programmes run into fiscal and 
organisational constraints; labour intensive ones carried out by 
the beneficiaries (of which several ILO, UNICEF, etc., funded cases 
exist) are practicable only if overall programmatic approaches are 
reshaped and fiance is available for the workers wages;
f. demobilisation is essential both to reduce the fiscal drag and to 
ensure/sustain security. But if 120,000 fighters (plus 480,000 
immediate family members) are to lose their 'jobs' without 
provision of livelihoods, the end result will not be security but 
both increases in absolute poverty and in 'freelance' banditry.
4. Normal development strategies and especially normal macroeconomic 
management strategies and accounting projections have little to say 
about this type of context. Presumably it is seen as so abnormal as 
not to warrant consideration. But it is our reality in Mozambique and 
we cannot embark on a normal development strategy (not even our
3Priority District Programme) for more than a minority of our people 
until that reality is addressed and overcome.
5. To do so requires an interim Reconstrucao (or livelihood
rehabilitation) strategy over at least seven years. It would serve as 
a bridge from Emergencia survival to Developmento. Mapping out the 
main elements of such an approach is quite feasible - especially for 
rural areas and sector familial households. They include:
a. allocation of sector familial farms on return home by refugees, 
dislocated and affected households;
b. provision of basic working capital (tools to clear, to build and to 
till, plus basic household equipment seeds and where relevant 
fishing equipment and small stock) to returning households and to 
those pauperised in place with homes and working capital destroyed 
by the war and/or drought;
c. provision of food to these households for 9 to 15 months until they 
have a full harvest (or income from crops grown or fish caught to 
sell) to sustain them;
d. parallel 'reconstruction' of access to basic services - health, 
education, water, agricultural extension basically via government 
(provincial and district level) capacity enhancement with initially 
limited (by poverty) user contributions;
e. together with re-establishment of the rural/small town commercial 
network requiring loans to recapitalise rural oriented private and 
cooperative commercants (produce buyers-merchants-transporters) to 
provide effective market access and at least some competition for 
sector familial business;
f. as well as basic physical infrastructure reconstruction based on 
user assessment of priorities, district and provincial managed and 
focused on seasonal, labour intensive work employing sector 
familial household members to enhance their cash incomes to meet 
non-food needs and to reflate both real demand and real fiscal 
revenue;
4g. in association with a demobilisation programme which - following an 
initial payment on turning in weapons and equipment - incorporates 
ex combatants and their dependents into the main rural livelihood 
rehabilitation strategy.
6. Urban reconstruction is both harder to articulate at present and more 
directly linked with normal macro economics - as well as with rural 
reconstruction:
a. one core element is reactivating idle capacity to increase 
productivity, real wages, fiscal revenue and investible surplus in 
a non-inflationary way;
b. which requires stronger effective demand from the sector familial, 
salario earners and urban sector familial (informal) sector wage 
earners and producers;
c. as well as restoration of access to the countryside both to secure 
inputs (including food and raw materials) and to sell products - 
both dependent on rural livelihood rehabilitation;
d. emphasis not on low pay, temporary, peripheral employment schemes 
which can benefit only the 4% unemployed not the other 46% below 
the absolute poverty line who suffer not from unsaleable time but 
from low productivity and/or reward but, rather, focus on 
permanent, reasonable productivity wage employment (salario or 
informal) and self-employment;
e. to be achieved through:
i.) shifting to more labour intensive techniques where these are 
economic, as they would be in urban rehabilitation, partly 
construction more generally as well as in some public service 
provision (partially achieved in refuse collection);
ii.) providing effective access to credit, markets and services 
(e.g. training, accounting) for medium-smal1-micro 
enterprises;
5iii.) as well as to the artisanal (sector familial and micro 
enterprises, e.g. canoe fishermen and commercially oriented 
zonas verdes plots and workshops) sector;
iv.) general re-utilisation of existing capacity, albeit this is 
more likely to allow real salario increases than to raise 
employment even in the medium term because neither the
private nor the public sector layed off as fast as output has
declined over 1981-86.
f. this approach would support the potentially dynamic, reasonable 
productivity elements in the so-called informal sector, which is so 
diverse as to be a near useless single category for analytical and 
policy purposes. Its pure survival elements - especially ultra
petty commerce - would probably benefit from higher real wages
(salario and informal) since these are the largest single element 
in 80% of household incomes and, therefore, in the capacity of its 
customers to afford higher real commercial and minor service 
provision margins;
g. in parallel urban - like rural - basic services need to be 
reconstructed (especially in quality terms and in that respect most 
notably in respect of primary and applied continuing adult 
education) and to be expanded (to serve the 1980s expansion in 
canisa and permanent peri-urban residents) again with potential for 
user contributions limited so long as urban absolute poverty is 
over - say - 25% (versus 50% in late 1991);
h. and with general urban infrastructure (including road and housing) 
rehabilitation;
i. with an urban component of the demobilisation programme for ex­
combatants from the cities to include interim food allowances and 
training (plus basic tools/working capital for artisans) analogous 
to the tools-seed-tools rural livelihood rehabilitation package.
7. The macroeconomic dynamic is relatively clear:
a. enhanced rural production of food, domestic raw materials and
exportables;
6b. leading to enhanced nutrition (and ability to work harder and more 
productively), and cash incomes as well as reduced food and raw 
material import requirements and enhanced export levels;
c. fuelling demand to validate urban economic capacity utilisation and 
expansion as well as increasing availability of inputs;
d. allowing higher levels of nationally financed imports flowing into 
production and of commercial turnover feeding into revenue as well 
as to profits enhancing investible surplus and direct taxation on 
enterprises.
e. allowing reconstruction of basic services (health, education, 
water, agricultural extension, urban) crucial for short as well as 
long term productivity increases and
f. of physical infrastructure vital to economic rehabilitation and 
development as well as of the rural commercial network.
8. However, magnitudes and timings on both the cost and revenue sides
cannot be projected with any great accuracy. This is not simply
because the data base is very weak - which it surely is, nor because
there is little analysed post-war reconstruction experience for very 
poor economies. Rather it relates to timing of drought (and its 
ending), insecurity (and its elimination), capacity building at both 
local and provincial government and at small enterprise level and the 
flow of funds to the reconstruction programmes.
9. On a very rough set of projections (set out in the subsequent sections)
GDP by the end of fifth year could increase by up to $1,000 million.
Absolute poverty could on that basis be reduced from about 65% to 25% 
to 30%. Consistent with reducing the nutrition gap substantially 
(allowing for a one-third increase in resident population) food aid 
could be cut from 500,000/600,000 to 200,000/300,000 tonnes a year. 
Ongoing government spending arising out of the programme would be 
likely to total $175 million gross and $105 million net with additional 
recurrent revenue from the $700 million monetised addition to GDP 
slightly larger. Additional exports plus direct import substitution 
(excluding food aid reduction) and direct (including inputs into 
production and transport) ongoing imports could approximately balance
7around $140 to $150 million. They might show a small deficit which 
logically would be closed from expansion in tourism, transit transport 
and power exports (and import substitution) parallel to, but not 
included in, Reconstrucao proper. Thus the macro projections show 
Reconstrucao to be viable once established, able to increase output and 
food security and to reduce absolute poverty significantly and roughly 
in balance on fiscal and external account. While closing poverty, 
nutrition and social imbalances it could not, by itself, substantially 
erode overall fiscal and external account imbalances. However, non- 
Reconstrucao development in hydropower (including restoration of 
exports), tourism and transit transport plus mining and hydrocarbons 
(gas exports) could begin that rebalancing while Reconstrucao laid the 
livelihood and human investment base for a broader development effort 
by the late 1990s. Overall the gross cost of Reconstrucao would 
approach £2,000 million over 5 years. However, up to $1,200 million 
could be met from reallocation and $155 million from domestic revenue 
gains leaving about $630 million additional external resource 
requirements of which $415 million relate to special (refugees, 
demobilisation) and $215 million to general rehabilitation costs.
10. Certain macroeconomic policy approaches need revision (or provision of 
supplementary parallel mechanism) for this strategy to be viable:
a. credit for reactivating capacity, facilitating the small, micro and 
artisanal enterprise sectors, and rehabilitating the rural 
commercial network cannot be provided within current bank credit 
ceilings which already prevent validation of produced output 
(notably in agriculture);
b. requiring either new approaches (incorporating calculation of real 
floor levels required to allow enhanced real output as well as 
monetary ceilings to limit inflation) to credit ceiling calculation 
or/and new credit channels not counted as bank credit (even if 
commercial banks may be involved as agents);
c. expansion of basic service coverage (and, especially in the case of 
education, quality rehabilitation) and rehabilitation of public 
service salarios to minimum levels consistent with efficiency;
8d. initially requiring additional as well as reallocated external 
finance (perhaps partly by selective reduction of provision of 
overseas personnel and training in favour of temporary, agreed 
public service salary enhancement for middle and high skill posts 
plus local joint venture training) to avoid reopening an 
inflationary domestic borrowing requirement.
These are modifications within PRE and PRES macroeconomic strategy - 
not an abandonment of that strategy. But they are crucial to 
stabilisation and price relativity adjustment costs being able to pay 
off in contributing to an enabling climate for enhanced production.
11. It also depends on revised perceptions by resource providers;
a. recognition that until livelihoods are rehabilitated the reduction 
of emergency survival support will mean destitution and even death 
but that shifting resources gradually from emergency to 
rehabilitation does provide a route back to development and, 
ultimately, to lower Mozambican net resource inflow requirements;
b. implying that Emergencia funding should be considered to be 
fungible at least to Reconstrucao;
c. while also recognising that the number of households needing 
assistance in livelihood rehabilitation (as well as the scarcity of 
middle level Mozambican support personnel and the total 
inappropriateness of expatriates beyond central and provincial 
coordination levels) requires simple, low unit cost per household 
served, swiftly beginning, broad coverage, expansible programmes 
which are, perhaps analogous to Emergencia but the exact opposite 
of most donor designed or redesigned rural development projects and 
especially of most new large scale agricultural enterprises or 
large scale (even if sector familial cropped) irrigation schemes;
d. and which are much harder to analyse with any precision or 
estimation of magnitude and timing of returns than - say - 
hydroelectric or major infrastructural projects;
e. requiring some reallocation from long pay off period, high capital 
cost per benefiting household projects especially in agriculture;
9f. but that in the initial years of reconstrucao (and particularly in 
respect to demobilicao) net additional resources will be needed 
until benefit flows first balance and then exceed expenditure, 
especially because basic public service spending per capita and - 
implicitly - non-uniformed government employment are currently less 
than half those posited in the World Bank's Long Term Perspective 
Study which is, in a real sense, the foundation from and toward 
which Reconstrucao has been elaborated.
12. A series of significant institutional changes affecting donors as well
as the Government of Mozambique will be necessary:
a. redressing the imbalance under which 40% of non-military, non-debt 
service recurrent expenditure budgeting and disbursement but only 
about 4% of capital is now effectively decentralised to Provinces 
- a shift affecting donor-Provincial, almost more than Ministry of 
Finance-Provincial, relations and requiring recapacitation of 
Provincial Planning Commissions;
b. operating Reconstrucao within a national strategic, macroeconomic 
and coordination frame but with articulation, budgeting and 
implementation dominantly at Provincial level (and, to the extent 
capacity makes this practicable, at District level);
c. negotiating Emergencia and Reconstrucao together to allow gradual 
resource shifts former to the latter as well as coordinating 
Reconstrucao and Development proper, initially to facilitate 
reallocations from the latter to the former;
d. creating a means to integrate UNDP and UNHCR support for livelihood 
rehabilitation for domestic and externally displaced persons into a 
single operational whole within the overall national strategy and 
Provincial articulation and operation, rather than arriving at 
three different programmes with different (and potentially 
significantly inconsistent) styles;
e. ensuring that demobilisation support includes not only initial 
allowances but also funding livelihood rehabilitation (rural and 
urban);
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f. greater joint evaluation of recurrent and capital expenditure 
because a substantial portion of rehabilitacao/reconstrucao is on 
the borderline between the two while another large proportion is 
recurrent expenditure targeted toward creating an enabling climate 
for early output recovery;
g. avoiding creation of new parallel institutions and commissions - 
indeed where possible reducing present overlaps and tightening 
lines of accountability - while enhancing coordination primarily 
through more creative use of the work of the National Budget 
(Finance) and National Planning Directorates.
The foregoing review implies that while Reconstrucao should be an
analytical and programming focus, including detailed Reconstrucao sub­
votes in - e.g. - Provincial primary health care or even agricultural 
extension and especially have separate sub-categories of personnel 
would rarely be necessary or even appropriate.
Rural Livelihood Rehabilitation: Numbers, Phasing, Costs
13. For three reasons Rural Livelihood Rehabilitation must be the backbone 
of Reconstrucao:
i.) 7,500,000 persons in 1,100,000 households or over half the total
probable 1991 population of 14 million (including refugees) are
involved vs a total population of 3,000,000 in the cities;
ii.) adequate demand to reflate the urban economy and adequate food to 
feed it require recovery of sector familial production, marketing 
and demand;
111.) exports and local sourcing of artisanal and manufacturing 
enterprise inputs can be raised rapidly only if the sector 
familial is assisted in regaining its feet.
14. Table 1 sets out a resume of numbers of household by characteristic.
In all cases except "pauperised in place" an initial move/return is
needed although this may be much shorter for affectados. Most 
households - on somewhat qualitative expressions of opinion - wish to 
return to home district sector familial lands. Because neither 
security nor capacity to support will change instantly, that in itself 
requires phasing. Urban residents (as opposed to peri-urban affectados 
huddled on quarter hectare sandpiles) are assumed to intend to remain
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in the urban areas - indeed many probably moved during the war but for 
much more complex reasons. 1993/94 figures are particularly 
speculative because full scale implementation depends on mobilising 
finance as well as domestic institutions and - above all - on 
termination of the drought and continued reduction of the levels of 
insecurity preventing return to many districts. The latter condition 
does not mean no insecurity - let alone no danger to expatriate 
visitors - Mozambican sector familial households have a more pragmatic 
judgement. About 100,000 households "went home" over 1988-91.
However, that does mean most "easy" re-establishment has already been 
done. There are already reports of failed re-establishment efforts 
with some households perishing in the attempt, e.g. in Zambesia in late 
1991.
15. Costs are set out in Table 2. The total covers the five return years. 
Some special programmes would be needed for two further years if - as 
rural livelihood rehabilitation posits - support is concentrated in the 
first year but continues (especially in respect to infrastructure 
rehabilitation and wages therefrom) for three. Further, most basic 
services and some infrastructure expenditure flows would be melded into 
the normal budget - closing down newly reopened primary schools and 
health posts or abandoning local road maintenance would hardly be 
rational. These elements are included in Table 6 which evaluates post 
Reconstrucao fiscal questions.
16. The total Rural Reconstrucao costs as schematised in Table 2 come to 
$1,612.5 million gross over five years or $322,500,000 per year. That 
is the same order of magnitude as Emergencia over 1987-1990. Adding 
support to Mozambican refugees would raise that total to something 
approaching $500 million a year. While Emergencia and support to 
refugees cannot simply be re-christened Rural Livelihood Rehabilitation 
they can most certainly be phased down as Reconstruction takes hold.
By the end of 1997/98 it could be cut back to natural calamities 
(drought and flood) which, while substantial in some years of severe 
drought would normally not exceed one-fifth present Emergencia costs. 
Unlike Emergencia and refugee support - which do ensure survival for 
deslocados and refugees (though not for most deslocados or "pauperised 
in place" households) but offer no hope for return to self-sufficiency, 
Rural Livelihood Rehabilitation does lead back toward normal
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development based on self supporting sectoral familial households so 
that its costs - except for continuing basic service expansion and 
rural infrastructure maintenance which would become part of basic 
fiscal operations - are self terminating.
17. The expenditure categories as set out in Table 2 and notes are 
reasonably self explanatory with the possible exception of "D" - Market 
Revival. In rural Mozambique the small trader/transporter commercial 
network quite literally drove off into the sunrise at independence.
Its rebuilding by Mozambican entrepreneurs, co-ops and Agricon was at 
best partial and was then crippled by the war from 1981. The basic 
requirements for reviving it are lorries and working capital in the 
form of goods to sell. These cannot be financed through domestic banks 
because of foreign exchange constraints and credit ceilings, but 
without them price incentives cannot be effective nor the sector 
familial earn the cash to pay for (or reach the goods to meet) its 
basic needs beyond household produced and consumed food, housing and 
craft products. Unlike the other expenditure items, the £275 million 
would be in the form of loans whose repayment could create a revolving 
fund for small scale rural enterprise (private, co-operative or local 
governmental). Agricon's continued role (and expanded buying capacity) 
as a large wholesale buyer competing for custom with other wholesalers 
is for the medium term essential both to set floor prices in a context 
of oligopsony and because private and co-op enterprises prefer to use 
Agricon as a wholesale buyer rather than carry out longer distance 
trade in agricultural commodities.
Urban Reconstruction: Parameters And Costs
18. The Urban side of Reconstrucao is much harder to present schematically 
than the rural for four reasons:
a. much of the urban rehabilitation - both as to capacity utilisation 
and increases in real wages to minimum efficiency levels - depends 
on overall macroeconomic recovery rather than specific urban 
expenditures; and in particular
b. the largest single impetus to enhanced urban production should be
revitalised rural demand from RLRP;
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c. substantial urban investment and production raising programmes -
e.g. the World Bank's urban rehabilitation scheme, urban power 
development, ports and railways, tourism, large scale manufacturing 
- fall outside the Reconstrucao programme proper even if their 
export, employment and revenue enhancement effects can make 
significant contributions to creating, together with Reconstrucao,
a stable foundation for broadly based development from the late 
1990s;
d. while the specific labour intensity, small enterprise and artisanal 
sector components of urban reconstruction are harder to cost than 
those of RLRP because, to date, less data and analysis are 
available.
- 19. Table 3 sets out rough parameters for Urban Reconstruction
concentrating on livelihood rehabilitation for those in the 50% 
absolutely poor in urban areas both by direct measures, through 
services and infrastructure restoration and by providing access to 
credit-training-services to more small, micro and artisanal enterprises 
and also through seeking to incorporate more labour intensive 
approaches into the Urban Rehabilitation project sequence and into 
other urban construction outside the Reconstrucao Programme proper.
20. The total (including the rehabilitation of the livelihoods of urban 
origin ex-combatants) is estimated at $353 million. That is about 17J% 
of total Rural plus Urban Reconstruction costs of $2,000 million odd 
over five years. The urban population is about 3 million or 21§% of 14 
million probable Mozambicans in Mozambique plus refugees as of the end 
of 1991. The difference relates to present less massive shortages of 
basic services and less bad infrastructure in urban programmes, to the 
positive impact of rural effective demand recovery on urban production 
and wages, and to projects (e.g Urban Rehabilitation, large scale 
enterprise investments) not within Reconstrucao.
Reallocation and Mobilisation: Financing Reconstrucao
21. The total cost of funding Reconstrucao (in 1991 $) over 1993/94 - 
1997/98 is of the order of $2,000 million. (Addition of Tables 2, 3.) 
If that entire amount needed to be mobilised as additional general 
donor support then Reconstrucao - however necessary - would be
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impracticable because not fundable. However, as set out in Table 4, 
the net additional general purpose external support required over the 
initial three years is of the order of $300 million and in the last two 
years goes negative.
22. Over five years Emergencia can be phased down from the order of $300 
million in 1990/91 (and a much higher drought imposed 1991/92 level) to 
$100 million or less. Over five years the reallocation should come to 
$575 million unless 1989/90 did mark the beginning of five years of 
poor to disastrous rainfall (as did 1979/80). This reallocation needs 
to follow resettlement so cannot reach its full $300 million potential 
before 1996/97.
23. Reallocation from large capital intensive projects - notably 
irrigation, large scale farming schemes and large, 100% government 
owned factories - could total $350 million over five years. These are 
classes of projects with a very poor track record on results but have 
consistently been a quarter to a half of the $300 million odd capital 
budget because of their relative suitability for sophisticated 
technical presentation (albeit not accurate projection of results) and 
their attractiveness to advocates of quick fixes or large contracts.
24. Not all large capital intensive projects are unsound. Given the 
inheritance of the concreto urban cores, Urban Rehabilitation is needed 
but should become more labour intensive. Similarly major 
transportation rehabilitation and modernisation is crucial to restore 
transit traffic foreign exchange earnings and domestic arterial 
transport links (including coastal shipping) and to reduce transport 
costs of landlocked neighbours. Nor should enterprise (private, public 
or joint venture) borrowings able to service external credits both in 
cash flow and external account terms - e.g. hydrocarbons (especially 
gas), Cahora Basa restoration and direct linkage to Zimbabwe, Maputo, 
Swaziland and selected industrial projects including some transport 
equipment and textile ventures be vetoed. However, there is no evident 
reason to include this last category in the state budget.
25. Technical assistance reallocations should be attainable up to 
$75 million. Overseas training instead of Mozambique based joint 
venture courses and provision of expatriate replacements costing up to 
twenty times what it would cost to provide adequate incentives to
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retain or hire Mozambican professionals are very inefficient both in 
value for money and in capacity building terms. Indeed on the second 
count their contribution is negative and substantial.
26. Within the Mozambican Recurrent Budget $190 million should become 
available over 1993/94 - 1997/98 from reduced military expenditure 
requirements. The exact timing depends on the pace at which
demobilicao, complemented by the Santa Egida peace talks, can reduce 
sabotage, terrorism and rural insecurity/isolation.
27. Therefore reallocation can total the order of $1,200 million or 60% of 
gross Reconstrucao requirements.
28. Domestic fiscal gains from taxes on additional monetised output and 
cash plus labour/materials user contributions toward basic service 
costs can yield another 7j% or $155 million.
29. This leaves $628 million over five years ($593 million over the first 
three) beyond 1990/91 levels of external support. Of that $414 million 
relates to two special programmes which are eligible for special 
finance:
a. Refugee return and livelihood rehabilitation costing about
$230 million for 1,500,000 persons (probably of the same order of 
magnitude as present international support over five years);
b. Demobilisation including initial allowances and livelihood 
rehabilitation costing about $185 million for 120,000 ex-combatants 
and 480,000 household members.
UNHCR is committed to substantial support to refugee return and 
reintegration (in a sense reallocation for supporting them outside 
Mozambique). On the basis of its partial, preliminary estimates this 
should be in the $100 to 150 million range. Countries - such as Japan 
- seeking to utilise external assistance to support peace processes and 
post war economic rehabilitation are also likely to see the self 
concluding refugee rehabilitation and demobilisation programmes as 
qualifying for support beyond basic country allocations. Italy and 
Switzerland are committed to providing substantial support for 
demobilisation - perhaps up to half the total required.
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30. The net additional general external assistance (above 1990-91 levels) 
needed to fund Reconstrucao is of the order of $215 million. This is 
front end loaded with $166.5 million in 1993/94 because reallocation 
and revenue generation will lag resettlement by 12 to 18 months for 
initial substantial gains and perhaps twice as long for full potential. 
The 1994/95 plus 1995/96 requirement totals are about $130 million 
while 1996/97 and 1997/98 projections of net additional requirements 
are, in fact, negative because of resettlement programme completions 
and rising fiscal and reallocation gains.
31. The phasing of costs (and benefits) depends on the effective pace of 
programme start up. If financial mobilisation, demobilisation and 
refugee return and/or general resettlement capacity build-up are 
delayed the 1993/94 (and perhaps 1994/95) costs will be lower but 
subsequent year costs will be higher and, indeed a portion of the main 
body of the Reconstrucao expenditure will spill over into 1998/99.
32. One uncertainty is weather. 1992/93 Emergencia costs are likely to be 
$100 million or more above 1990/91 levels because of 1991/92 drought. 
Because of drought related physical debilitation and low seed 
availability, 1993/94 crops (even in the absence of bad weather over 
the 1992/93 main crop season) will be below normal requiring higher 
food aid and Emergencia support in 1993/94 than in 1990/91.
Livelihood Rehabilitation and GDP
33. The gross domestic product increase resulting from livelihood 
reconstruction of $942,500,000 estimated in Table 5 is both substantial 
and, initially, surprising. It amounts to in the range of $400 to $600 
per household in the direct benefit categories - an increase which 
would allow most to re-establish themselves at or above the absolute 
poverty line.
34. In evaluating the plausibility of the estimate three factors need to be 
recognised:
a. present GDP estimates - apart from inaccuracies as such - are gross 
underestimates (as explained in the Notes to Table 5) so that the 
near 100% comparative increase is misleading because of non­
comparability;
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b. the rural economy of Mozambique has since 1981 been shattered by 
external aggression and war so that over 100% growth of output in 
the sector familial is basically regaining the 1981 (or the 
moderately higher 1972) position;
c. the urban value added increase pivots on the recovery of access to 
the rural market and rural input sources allowing reactivation of 
existing capacity justified by restored demand.
35. Net output by the 1,100,000 livelihood restoration families is 
estimated to rise by $490,000,000 - representing primarily restoration 
of basic food self-sufficiency and restoration of homes (50%) and 
partially restored food, export and industrial crop and artisanal sales 
(about 40%). The average of $450 per household is by no means 
implausibly high for a stable sector familial household. It approaches 
the rural absolute poverty threshold.
36. Because infrastructure, market access, agricultural extension and basic 
service restoration will also benefit other sector familial families 
their output can be expected to rise by $50,000,000 while the re­
establishment of rural/transport and commerce to make possible and to 
validate enhanced production has a value added impact of the order of 
$100 million. Ongoing basic services and small scale infrastructure 
contribution (basically wages) is of the order of $65,000,000, i.e. 10% 
of the total rural gain of $687,500,000 (about 45% household self­
provisioning) estimated for 1998/99.
Fiscal Sustainability - An Exploration
37. To represent a transition to more normal development, Reconstrucao must 
be fiscally sustainable. That means that from 1998/99 the additional 
domestic revenues from enhanced output must approximate enhanced 
ongoing recurrent basic services and small scale infrastructure 
investment.
38. The projections in Table 6 indicate that Reconstrucao can pass this 
test on the - plausible - assumption that total incremental tax revenue 
is of the order of 20% of additional commercialised (monetised) GDP and 
that a $50 million reduction in military expenditure is achieved and 
sustained. Total additional expenditure is (in 1991 $ prices)
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estimated at $ 1 7 7,5 0 0 ,0 0 0; additional revenue at $ 1 4 3,5 0 0,000 
($1 5 0,0 0 0 , 0 0 0 counting user service cost contributions in goods and 
labour) and military cost reductions at $5 0 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0 for a net projected 
domestic fiscal gain of $2 2 ,5 0 0,0 0 0. User contributions in cash and 
goods/labour are estimated at $2 5 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0 a level not implausible if 
real minimum wages, real artisanal incomes and sector familial 
production rise as projected leading to a substantial reduction in the 
nearly two-thirds unable to pay substantial contributions at present 
because of absolute poverty.
39. This level of fiscal strengthening will clearly not solve Mozambique's
fiscal problem. Nor is Reconstrucao intended to do that. Rather it is
to parallel output growth elsewhere in the economy and to lay a 
foundation for normal development restoration which can generate 
additional revenues above necessary additional recurrent expenditures.
Balance Of Payments Considerations
40. The projected external balance impact of Reconstrucao is basically 
neutral as set out in Table 7. Additional exports and imports are both 
projected to be of the order of $140,000,000 in 1998/99.
41. The ratio of exports and of imports at slightly under 25% of additional
commercialised GDP is relatively low. However, that turns on the 
nature of Livelihood Rehabilitation - domestic food, services and 
manufactured goods. Several major export generating (and import using) 
sectors: e.g. tourism, corporate agriculture, mining, energy, large 
scale transport and commercial fishing/prawning - are outside its 
scope.
42. The main query over these projections lies not on the export volume - 
which is within 1981 and 1972 sector familial and secondary urban 
export levels - but the use of 1991 $ prices. This does assume no 
further terms of trade deterioration, especially for cashew nuts, 
prawns and cotton. That, however, is not a problem specific to 
Reconstrucao. The 1980s terms of trade collapse has meant that most 
SSA economies, even when physical exports rose rapidly, have been 
running rather fruitlessly up the down escalator in respect to 
attaining absolute reduction in trade deficits.
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43. As with overall fiscal gap closing, the overall trade balance's closure 
is not (cannot be) a Reconstrucao target. That target must be applied 
to parallel and subsequent development programming. The Reconstrucao 
test is whether output increase by rural livelihood rehabilitation and 
reflation of demand for urban output to validate rural sales to urban
areas can be achieved without radical worsening of the trade balance.
That test it appears to pass.
Food Security: Toward A Breakthrough
44. A primary test of any Livelihood Rehabilitation based strategy in 
Mozambique is its potential contribution to physical national and to 
household entitlements aspects of food security. The national food 
balance estimates at Table 8 indicate a near return to national 
provisioning (6% imports vs 14% in 1990/91) consistent with a radical
reduction in the overall food deficit (7% vs 25% in 1990/91) can be
achieved by 1998/99. The change is so dramatic because prior to 1981 
Mozambique had a near balance position in basic foods (excluding sugar 
which was a major export) albeit it also had a larger food deficit 
after imports (i.e. levels of hunger and malnutrition) than the posited 
1998/99 attainable level. Because the fall has come from war which has 
destroyed security to produce, basic physical infrastructure, market 
access and basic services, the reversal of these factors can allow the 
sector familial (the largest colonial era producer of commercialised 
food and of agricultural exports) to restore output reasonably rapidly. 
The key is enabling the nearly three-quarters of sector familial 
households now totally or nearly out of production to re-enter it at 
their former levels or modestly above them.
The pattern of near national balance arising from the estimates is 
consistent with that of Tanzania - another territorial unit with varied 
but, on balance, relatively poor land/rainfall and with a rural economy 
dominated by sector familial production. The parallelism includes the 
lower rural rather than the urban food deficit - low income urban 
households do consume more manufactured goods plus services but less 
food than their rural analogues.
45. The projections assume 1998/99 to be a normal (neither drought stricken 
nor blessed by particularly favourable weather) year. Evidently the 
out-turn (on GDP, Fiscal and External Account as well as Food Balance)
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would be substantially worse were it a drought year. If it were a 
bumper harvest year GDP, External Account and Food Balance out-turns 
would be improved, but the Fiscal Account would worsen because of 
losses on exports of surpluses and because the credit requirements of 
purchasing them in the first place would place strains on monetary 
management.
46. 1998/99 Food Aid imports ar targeted at 200,000 tonnes. The rationale 
is that:
a. Mozambique - even with successful Reconstrucao - will in 1998/99 
still be one of the world's poorest countries;
b. Food aid will remain a significant proportion of total assistance 
resources available and will not be fully convertible into untied 
monetary aid;
c. Between 50,000 and 100,000 tonnes of wheat and rice will be
required above domestic production and can be commercialised to
meet domestic costs (reduce combined Recurrent/Capital Budget cash 
flow deficit);
d. Even in normal years rural calamities and urban safety net 
provision will require at least 50,000 tonnes of food (whether 
directly distributed or sold to pay wages on work for food 
projects);
e. Project food aid - e.g. construction of provincial level highways,
medium to large scale reafforestation - could be partially financed 
via the sale of up to 50,000 tonnes a year.
47. These rough calculations suggest 200,000 tonnes is an attainable and
efficiently usable target for grant and soft loan food aid in 1989/90.
The Struggle Against Absolute Poverty - Reversing The 1980s
48. A central goal of Mozambican political, social and economic strategy is 
rapid reduction of the proportion of households existing in absolute 
poverty through providing them with basic services and an enabling 
environment in which they can produce more. The centre piece of this 
strategy over 1993/94 - 1997/98 is the Rural Livelihood Rehabilitation
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Strategy to enable the rural sector familial to restore its production 
thereby restoring demand for urban production and validating recovery 
in real wages toward minimum efficiency levels. A major supporting 
thrust is restoring/enhancing urban artisanal sector and micro/small 
enterprise ability to produce in the enabling climate created by 
enhanced rural demand for urban goods and ability to provide inputs 
into processing and manufacture as well as food.
49. Table 9 indicates that the Rehabili.tacao strategic programmes could 
reduce the proportion of households in absolute poverty from 65% in 
1990/91 to 24% in 1998/99. These levels compare with the World Bank 
1990 estimates of 32% poverty in SSA as a whole or about 25% excluding 
Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Zaire, Malawi and Sudan. While 1980/81 
absolute poverty line percentage estimates do not exist for Mozambique 
a rough evaluation of available macro data and distribution 
characteristics suggests they were in the 25% to 30% range.
50. The rural reduction estimates - from 90% for RLRP households and 30% 
for other rural to 25% and 20% are relatively firm given attainment of 
the sector familial output and income targets. The basic question in 
respect to them is the distribution of sector familial household 
incomes in 1989/90. Differences in relative land scarcity and quality 
and of location will certainly cause some scatter, but it should not be 
extreme and, in particular, the proportion of households unable to 
reach approximate household level food balance at or near basic 
nutritional adequacy levels would appear likely to be relatively low.
51. The urban reduction estimates from 50% to 27|% are more tentative.
They turn very heavily on restoration of the real salario minimale's 
purchasing power to about $40 a month (1991 prices) with its 
consequential impact on micro and artisanal enterprise real wages and 
small producer earnings. So far as the enterprise sector goes the pure 
logic economic efficiency in the context of restored demand should 
contribute substantially to that result. The key problem is achieving 
what both governance efficiency and macroeconomic recovery require but 
fiscal constraints since 1981 increasingly have prevented - the 
Government of Mozambique paying it. While the data at Table 7 allow 
that crucial shift in respect to Basic Services programmes initiated 
under Reconstrucao, the overall fiscal position (and donor attitudes to
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resource use to pay minimum efficiency wage levels) are more 
problematic.
52. The 27j% 1989/90 estimate of urban absolute poverty is dominated by 
households with inadequate quantity or quality of labour power. In 
order of size these are limited (or no) education single adult headed 
households with no formal sector job; households with average income 
but above average number of dependents; households headed by waged 
persons and households headed by disabled persons. The first and 
largest category are in practice overwhelmingly female headed. No 
plausible programme can do more than erode this hard core absolute 
poverty during the 1990s, because lack of labour time is its basic 
characteristic additional employment opportunities will be largely - 
though not totally - irrelevant and labour quality upgrading will be 
very hard to achieve. Therefore, the basic strategic approach will 
need to be through safety net support programmes not Livelihood 
Restoration. These continuing safety net programmes (unlike 
transitional ones for demobilicados and selected categories of low 
salario workers) are not part of Reconstrucao.
53. All of the figures in Table 9 relate to one aspect only of Absolute 
Poverty - household earned income (including household self­
provisioning) . They do not include social and human gains from 
enhanced access to basic services nor reduction in workloads 
(especially on women). The gains on these heads within Reconstrucao 
should be significant given its basic public services thrust.
54. So far as household ability to consume is concerned, Reconstrucao 
proper does not, by definition, address safety nets because it is 
household production (including basic services, physical infrastructure 
and market infrastructure enabling context creation) focused.
Calamities Commission (basically rural drought and flood relief) and 
urban safety net programmes are envisaged as the main parallel 
strategic cluster to alleviate the impact of absolute poverty on 
households existing in it. What Reconstrucao can do is to reduce the 
numbers of households requiring safety net support to more manageable 




55. Mozambique needs a strategic initiative to reconstruct livelihoods, 
restore basic food balance and reduce absolute poverty as a transition 
from Emergencia survival to broad front Developmento. Without such a 
transition, standard development strategies will be accessible only to 
a minority of the people and it will not be possible to create an 
enabling economic, social and political climate in which Mozambican 
households have the capacity to respond to economic incentives.
56. Reconstrucao can be designed and implemented in ways which do meet 
these transition to development objectives. Production of goods and 
services by the sector familial (including its urban artisanal 
counterpart) in conjunction with restoration and extension of basic 
services, rehabilitation of small scale rural and urban infrastructure 
and revitalisation of the rural commercial network can yield 
substantial and sustainable macro economic gains in respect to GDP, 
export, fiscal revenue, food balance and absolute poverty eradication.
57. That approach is not a departure or a diversion from PRE/PRES or the 
Struggle Against Absolute Poverty. Rather it constitutes a necessary 
complement to the first and the main means to ensure rapid progress in 
the second. Because livelihood rehabilitation is the central need of 
over half of Mozambique's households, including over 7,500,000 rural 
and up to 1,000,000 urban persons, a five year programme is required. 
Both financial and personnel, as well as institutional and 
implementational (public, private and household) capacity, constraints 
make a shorter time horizon impractical; the urgency of restoring the 
economic, social and political fabric of the majority of our households 
forbids a more leisurely pace. (Table 1)
58. The rural livelihood rehabilitation component will cost $1,600 million 
over 1993/94 through 1997/98. It will serve about 1,100,000 households 
(7,500,000 persons) including external desplacados (refugees), 
deslocados (domestic refugees), affectados households "pauperised in 
place" and demobilicados (ex-combatants and families). Its main 
components are tools and materials to restore homes and production, 
basic services, physical infrastructure restoration through labour 
intensive works and enabling the re-establishment of the rural 
commercial network. (Table 2)
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59. The urban reconstruction effort turns on the reactivation of capacity 
made possible by increased rural effective demand based on the 
increases in production enabled by the rural livelihood rehabilitation 
programme. To complement this rural sector demand catalyst, training, 
services and capital are to be made available to the urban sector 
familial (artisanal), to micro enterprises and to small enterprises; 
basic services are to be restored (in qualitative as well as 
quantitative terms) and extended and small scale urban infrastructure 
(especially in the canisas) rehabilitated and extended. The total five 
year cost estimate is $360 million. (Table 3)
60. The gross five year cost is of the order of $2,000 million. Of this 
60% can be secured via reallocations in particular from Emergencia, 
large scale capital projects and military expenditure. Another £% can 
be financed from increased tax revenues derived from the gross domestic 
product generated by the programme. Of the balance of $630 million, 
$230 million relates to refugee return (and is in fact a reallocation 
of international resources from assisting them abroad) and $185 million 
is to cover the costs of demobilising and reintegrating ex-combatants 
and their families, a special investment in peace. The increase in 
general external support required is $215 million over five years. 
Because reallocation and revenue offsets follow on from initial 
reconstruction spending, this requirement is front end loaded with 
$166 million in 1993/94 and negative extra requirements in the fourth 
and fifth years. (Table 4)
61. Macro economic estimates of programme results and sustainability of 
gains have been made for 1988/89. These are necessarily order of 
magnitude estimates and their exact timing depends on the speed with 
which demobilicao and the complementary Santa Egida peace talks 
proceed, on the weather pattern and on the speed with which the 
programme can be begun. Briefly:
a. Gross Domestic Product increases total $940 million ($688 million 
rural and $255 million urban - Table 5);
b. Additional domestic revenue totals $143 million, expenditure
$178 million and savings on military expenditure $50 million for a
positive fiscal balance (Table 6);
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c. Programme enabled exports are estimated at $140 million in 1988/89, 
savings on military imports at $25 million and the direct and 
indirect import requirements of the additional GDP at $155 million 
leaving approximate external balance in relation to continuing 
impact of Reconstrucao (Table 7);
d. Food production can be expected to rise to 5,700,000 tonnes in 
1998/99 - 87% of basic food requirements vs 61% achieved in 1990/91 
allowing a substantial reduction in food aid consistent with 
reducing the food deficit after imports from 25% to 7% (Table 8);
e. Absolute poverty would, as a result of the household production and 
wage increases, be reduced to 24% in 1998/99 as contrasted with
65% in 1991. That is level comparable to the average for non­
disaster stricken SSA economies and is one (together with basic 
services, market access and infrastructure restoration) enabling 
the majority of Mozambican households to participate in, respond to 




Rural livelihood Rehabilitation 1993/4 — 1997/8
Numbers of Households1' and Possible Phasing
Category 1993/4 1994/5 1995/6 1996/7 1997/8 Total
Refugees (Ext­
ernally Displaced)2 40,000 70,000 50,000 40,000 15,000 215,000
Displaced (Int­
ernal Refugees) 40,000 70,000 50,000 40,000 15,000 215,000
Affected (Forced 
To Move3 100,000 150,000 100,000 50,000 30,000 430,000
Pauperised In 
Place4 25,000 50,000 40,000 20,000 5,000 140,000
Demobilised
Ex-Combatants6 40,000 50,000 10,000 - - 100,000
Total6 245,000 390,000 250,000 150,000 65,000 1,100,000
Notes:
1. Average household size estimated at 7 persons except for ex-Combatants estimated at 5.
Approximately 55% children under 15, 25% adult women, 20% adult men. One household in
4 female headed.
2. Official UNHCR estimates of 1.3 million persons exclude non-registered refugees in 
Zambia and also Swaziland and South Africa. On the other hand, they overstate Malawi 
where registering new arrivals is prompt and efficient but deleting returnees is 
neither, understandably from a Malawian perspective.
3. Households not in camps (effective distinctive characteristic of deslocados) forced to 
move by war and neither incorporated in urban life nor satisfactorily resettled from 
their own perspective (Many of new Beira Corridor residents are satisfactorily 
resettled but relatively few elsewhere).
4. Living in or near ruins of homes but with total or near total loss of residences, 
seeds, tools, food stocks, livestock.
5. Rural background households (20,000 in urban reconstruction estimates for urban 
background households).
6. Phasing highly approximate. Constraints are drought, security, capacity of agencies 
and state to assist. Larger 1994/5 targets would be desirable but financial, personnel 
and institutional limitations would make them dangerous because unassisted returnees 
are likely to fail to re-establish themselves and to flee again or even - as has 
happened - die.
Table 2
(000 1991 Price $)
Category 1993/4 1994/5 1995/6 1996/7 1997/8 Total13
A. Household Re­
















hold Equipment3 (25,000) (40,000) (25,000) (15,000) (6,000) (110,000)
Construction
Materials/
Simple Equipment'1 (5,000) (7,500) (5,000) (5,000) (2,500) (25,000)
B. Physical Infra­
structure Rehabil­
itation5’ 25,000 50,000 75,000 50,000 50,000 250,000
C. Basic Service Rest-
oration/Extension6 50,000 75,000 125,000 125,000 75,000 450,000




Capital)3 (25,000) (50,000) (50,000) (75,000) (25,000) (225,000)
Ditto Wholesale 
Enterprise” (5,000) (10,000) (10,000) (15,000) (10,000) (50,000)
Associated Public 
Infrastructure” (2,500) (5,000) (7,500) (7,500) (2,500) (25,000)
E. Associated Items 19,000 26,250 14,750 7,500 5,000 72,500
Refugee Return10 (5,000) (7,500) (5,000) (5,000) (2,500) (25,000)
Demobilisation
Allowances11 (9,000) (11,250) (2,250) - - (22,500)
Planning/Coordination 
(DNP, CCPs, Prov.
Works)12 (5,000) (7,500) (7,500) (2,500) (2,500) (25,000)
TOTAL 244,000 303,750 404,750 357,500 304,000 1,612,500
Notes:
From present location to home area. $50/household.
9 to 15 months to first main crop. $300-325/household including transport.
3. Tools to clear and till land and to rebuild home, tools, small stock, fishing 
equipment, seeds, basic household equipment - e.g. water pails. $100/household 
including transport.
4. Beams, poles, bricks, carpentry tools, block making machines, cement. Say $1,000 per 
village of 400 households.
5. Roads, culverts, ditches, small scale irrigation, ponds, other public buildings.
Rough breakdown:
Wages Seasonal Local Labour 125,000,000





6. Primary Health, Education, Agricultural Extension, Water.
Rough breakdown:





Buildings, Other Fixed Plant 100,000,000
(Rural service expansion/rehabilitation recurrent and capital cumulative over five 
years.)
7. Loans to 2,500 newly re-established rural merchants/transporters at $40,000 each - 
lorry, stock in trade finance. Loans to 500-750 co-operatives (expansion of capital 
base or new activity) at comparable capital input. $100 million subsequent finance 
(loan) of vehicle-warehouse-working capital expansion in addition to reinvested 
enterprise earnings.
8. Analogous to Note 7 for wholesale sector-private enterprises, co-ops and (as guarantor 
of minimum prices and of competition) Agricon.
9. Warehouses, markets, selected medium scale works.
10. $100-125 per person. Presumptively UNHCR financed. Subsequent expenses for refugees
incorporated in main programme heads. About 20% of totals.
11. Initial allowance of $150 per person at time of turning in gun and equipment. Plus 50%
addition for 'surplus' guns from Mozambique or South Africa turned in. Subsequent 
expenses incorporated in main programme heads (about 9% of totals).
12. Training, equipment, staff gap filling in coordination units - DNP, Provincial Planning 
Directorates - and crucial operating units especially Provincial Works Directorates 
(engineers, draughtsmen, artisans, foremen) to design/operate small fixed capital unit 
components of programme.
13. Rounded especially in "A" so line totals may not add exactly.
Table 3
Urban Reconstruction Toward Costing 
(000 1991 Price $)
Category 1993/4 1994/5 1995/6 1996/7 1997/8 Total13
A. Household
Re-establishment 13,000 20,500 19,500 18,000 13,000 84,000
Demobilisation1 (8,500) (10,000) (1,500) - - (19,500)
Interim Food 
Security2 (3,000) (8,000) (15,000) (15,000) (11,000) (52,000)
Artisanal Tools3 (500) (500) (500) (500) - (2,000)
Construction Materials/ 
Simple Equipment"1 (1,000) (2,000) (2,500) (2,500) (2,000) (10,000)
B. Secondary Urban 
Infrastructure 
Rehabilitation5 5,000 10,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 60,000
C. Basic Service Rehab­
ilitation/Extension5 10,000 15,000 25,000 25,000 15,00 90,000
D. Market Revival7 12,750 13,250 24,500 32,250 32,250 115,000
Small/Medium
Enterprise8 (7,500) (7,500) (15,000) (22,500) (22,500) (75,000)
Micro/Artisanal
Enterprise9 (3,750) (3,750) (7,500) (7,500) (7,500) (30,000)
Labour Intensive 
Technology10 (500) (1,000) (1,000) (1,250) (1,250) (5,000)
Financial System 
Training11 (1,000) (1,000) (1,000) (1,000) (1,000) (5,000)
E. Associated Items 3,000 3,500 1,250 1,250 1,000 10,000
Refugee Return12 


















TOTAL 43,750 62,250 82,250 91,500 76,250 358,000
Notes:
1. Assumes 20,000 households. If over one-sixth of estimated demobilised are urban in
origin this figure would be higher and analogous rural one lower. Divided into interim
employment/training/household equipment and allowance on turning in arms and equipment.
2. Approximately 80,000 waged urban households are below the absolute poverty line because
the minimum monthly salario is well below $30. In principle a food supplement (to
minimum wage for large households) and food subsidy programme do cover them as well as
the 120,000 who are in absolute poverty because of low household labour power. In fact 
both administrative and funding problems limit coverage. By 1996/97 the real minimum 
salario should - with recovery - have risen above $30 per month after which general 
economic development will be relevant to the 120,000 and to a degree the 80,000 (though 
to few of the 120,000). Interim coverage of 10,000 households in 1993/4, 25,000 in 
1994/5, 45,000 in 1996/7 and 35,000 in 1997/8 could reduce interim absolute poverty at 
$250 to $350 per year per household (including administration).
3. Many urban artisans (ex-artisans) cannot restore their livelihoods because they lack 
some or all of basic toolkit. Assumes 10,000 tool kits (tailors, builders, 
woodworkers, etc.) at average cost of $200.
4. For self-help housing including neighbourhood block, brick making in canisas. Perhaps 
contributions - in kind - to 50,000 houses at $100 each and 500 neighbourhood simple 
equipment sets at $500 plus $2.5 million training in simple construction/construction 
material skills
5. Excludes centre city main works and all main roads. Primarily ditches, drainage, 
levelling, minor public buildings, markets, etc., in canisas and some similar 
supporting work in poorer concreto areas. To be organised on labour intensive basis.
6. Rough estimate. Urban basic services are quantitatively less inadequate then rural but 
have significant quality problems. Figure excludes secondary/tertiary education and 
main hospitals but includes primary service worker (re)training and some secondary unit 
(e.g. small town hospital) rehabilitation or construction.
7. Market revival. While medium and large urban enterprises have more access to credit, 
present profit flows and foreign exchange than do rural this does not apply to 
artisanal, micro, small and newer medium scale ones other than urban transport. 
Employment, availability of goods/services, rehabilitation of two way urban-rural 
economic links all point to credit-training-technical services (e.g. accounting) 
packages accessible to these enterprises building on the Ministry of Labour and other 
body's experience.
8. 1,000 enterprises at $50,000 average credit plus $25 million applied skill and 
managerial training, services (especially accounting), administration and research. 
Probable employment 10,000 to 15,000.
9. 2,000 enterprises at $10,000 average credit plus $10 million related training, 
services, administration. Probable employment 10,00 to 15,000.
10. Pilot projects, adaptation/training, popularisation with special reference to 
construction (including mainline Urban Rehabilitation and large building construction 
not itself included as part of Reconstrucao).
11. The medium through artisanal loan scheme's sustained success depends on 
training/retraining commercial bank (public and private) personnel to allow an adequate 
capacity to process and to evaluate loan applications promptly.
12. Very few refugees are from cities or large towns. Small town and rural wage earning 
households usually also engage (of necessity) in sector familial production. Therefore 
all refugees are treated as wage earners. Persons who chose to enter urban areas 
during war - rather than entering deslocado camps or affectado resettlement - are among 
intended beneficiaries of main Urban Reconstrucao programmes but are not targeted as a 
separate category.
13. Some totals may not add exactly because of rounding.
Table 4
National Reconstruction: Possible Funding Projections 
($000 1991 Prices)
Category 1993/4 1994/5 1995/6 1996/7 1997/8 Total
A. Reallocation1 40,000 190,000 290,000 345,000 325,000 1,190,000
From Emergencia2 - (50,000) (125,000) (200,000) (200,000) (575,000)
From Large 
Capital Projects3 (25,000) (100,000) (100,000) (75,000) (50,000) (350,000)
From Technical 
Assistance"1 (5,000) (10,000) (15,000) (20,000) (25,000) (75,000)
From Military 
Expenditure5 (10,000) (30,000) (50,000) (50,000) (50,000) (190,000)
From Other Recurrent 6 NA NA NA NA NA ( " )















C. Domestic 1,000 8,000 21,000 45,000 80,000 155,000
Fiscal Gain From 
Programme” ( - ) (5,000) (15,000) (35,000) (65,000) (120,000)
User Contributions30 (1,000) (3,000) (5,000) (10,000) (15,000) (35,000)
D. Sub-total1 120,500 319,500 406,000 463,500 449,500 1,759,000
E. Additional
External Flow 
Needed11 166,500 46,500 84,000 (14,500) (69,250) 214,000
TOTAL12 287,750 366,000 490,000 449,000 380,250 1,973,000
Notes:
1. Reallocation from 1991/2 levels of expenditure. In 1991/2 prices except for minimum
salario rise to $40. Does not include reduction of UNHCR, host government, local
community contribution to refugees which now probably exceeds $250,000,000 a year.
2. Excludes additional (to 1991/2 based) drought related costs.
3. Existing projects and successors. Assumes some new large capital intensive projects
late in period with shift to developmento. Excludes new enterprise related, 
financially and externally self-liquidating enterprise investment, e.g. natural gas 
export, electricity production/transmission linked to exports (South Africa, Zimbabwe, 
Swaziland) and to direct import substitution (Maputo).
4. Substitution of domestic training (in this programme) for overseas training and of 
support for qualified Mozambican for provision of expatriates.
5. Wages, arms, vehicles, equipment, ammunition, fuel, spares, rations. Calculations 
speculative until trend of security makes possible detailed military spending reduction 
programme.
6. Total non Reconstrucao Recurrent spending is too low to provide basic minima of 
governance, services. Savings on some heads will be needed for increases on others.
7. UNHCR plus bilateral donors with peace promotion linked aid programmes (e.g. Japan). 
Calculated at external travel plus 20% of household rehabilitation and 10% of related 
service and infrastructure costs set out in Table 2. Refugees are 20% of total 
households covered.
8. Separate funding from bilaterals specifically concerned with restoration of peace, e.g. 
Switzerland, Italy Japan. Includes direct demob payment plus 9% rural household plus 
related services/infrastructure costs from Table 2. Demobilised households are 
estimated at 9% of all covered. Table 3 programme for domobilisados includes year's 
interim employment plus retraining.
9. Roughly estimated at 20% of programme generated additions to commercialised Gross 
Domestic Production. See Table 5 for fuller estimation for 1998/99.
10. Very rough estimate. Includes labour, materials, food as well as cash contributions.
11. Requirement for grants, very soft loans or reductions in actual external debt service 
payments (excluding arrears write-off or non-serviceable portion of amounts nominally 
due). Numbers in ( ) are negative (i.e. reduction in external resource transfer 
requirement).
12. Equal To Costs from Tables 2, 3.
Table 5
1998/99 Reconstruct o GDP Impact 
($000 at 1991 prices)
A. Additional Rural GDP Related To Reconstrucao
1. Sector Familial1 Provisioning Sold Total
(Programme Households)
■ Food (including animals, fish)2
■ Non-Food Crops (including
Forest Products)3
■ Artisanal Products'*
■ Home Farm Construction5
■ Basic Services In Kind5

















TOTAL 285,000 205,000 490,000
Per Household ($)" $260 $190 $450
Rural Absolute Poverty Line5 $470 - $520
2. Sector Familial10 30,000 20,000 50,000
(Other Households)
Wages Other Value Added Total










All Sold 107,500 
60,000 
47,500
5. Multiplier Effect15 Not Estimated 
TOTAL Reconstrucao Augmentation
To Rural GDP16 687,500 
Of Which Household Self Provisioning (315,000)
B. Additional Urban GDP Related To Reconstrucao
Provisioning Sold Total
1. Enterprise Added In Sales To:17 — 175,000 175,000
■ Rural Sector Familial
■ Commerce/Transport
■ Micro-Small Industry
■ Urban Sector Familial















2. Urban Sector Familial ("Informal") 2,000 12,000 14,000

















4. TOTAL Direct Impact 3, 500 201,500 205,000
5. Multiplier (25%)2° - 50,000 50,000
TOTAL - Urban GDP Increase
Related To Reconstrucao21 3 , 500____ 251, 500 255 , 000
TOTAL - GDP Increase
Related To Reconstrucao16' 21' 22 318,500 624,000 942,500
Notes:
1. Production for sale and household self-provisioning by the 1,100,000 households 
included in programme. Gross. Some households have low levels of present output not
transferable on relocation. However, as this affects only 425,000 deslocado households
and their production is (as valued) perhaps $100 per household the difference is under
10%. All items valued at value added level.
2. Estimate 2,750,000 tonnes grain equivalent food of which 2,000,000 consumed by
producers and 750,000 tonnes sold. Value at $100/tonne farmgate less $9.33/tonne 
purchased new labour inputs ($25,000,000 total purchases). Relatively low as grain 
equivalent tonne of vegetables, fruits, livestock, fish fetches substantially more.
(In the other crops cases also weighs substantially more.)
3. Includes both inputs into domestic industry and exports as well as household self­
provisioning (especially in fuel). Probable leading crops cotton, cashew.
4. Furniture, clothing, metal products, etc. Assumed purchased input content $10 million.
5. Assumed 1,100,000 homes lasting five years at value of $250. No estimate of land 
improvements, tree crop stands, additions to livestock herds made.
6. Largely labour for construction materials, food, furnishings.
7. Labour intensive rural infrastructure rehabilitation as cited in Table 2.
8. Relates to 1,100,000 households in programme.
9. Rough Estimation/Family of 7:
Urban Rural
Food $500 $225 1-’
Housing 100 50 2-)
Transport/Water
Fuel 75 25 3' ’
Other Goods/Services 175 220 > (170) s-’
Total $850____________ $520 (470)
1’> Farmgate prices plus limited purchases.
2_> Maintenance/Rebuilding Cost Valuation
3_> Fuel perhaps $2.5 and Water $5 on basis rural prices/User
Fees in kind and cash. Commuter transport urban phenomenon.
4"> Same basket - urban prices plus 25%.
s_> Altered basket relating artisanal to product for household
use and different tastes.
10. The physical infrastructure and commercial network rehabilitation plus immediate (e.g. 
time saved) benefits of basic services rehabilitation will enable output/income 
increases in other sector familial households as will enhanced provision of 
agricultural extension services. Roughly estimated as equal to 10% of programme 
households' gains. On 30,000 present households that is $170 per household.
11. Rough estimates based on Sector Familial sales/purchases. Value added basis.
12. 10% sales plus 15% purchases.
13. 10% sales plus 10% purchases.
14. Sales (Market Prices - including inputs plus value added)
15. Presumably some multiplier can be expected. However, because basic rural purchases 
from the rural sector familial are relatively low (perhaps $35 to $40 million) the 
multiplier effect would be very low. Would tend to be partial offset of overestimation 
cited in Note 1.
16. Rural GDP will also rise from non-Reconstrucao Cotton Authority, Cashew Authority, 
Commercial Farmer and provision of competent training/extension to Irrigation schemes. 
This could amount to $20 to $25 million on food crops and $25 to $50 Million on non­
food crops at value added level and $50 to $87| million at sales level. If 1,500,000 
rural households in 1998/9 that is $30 to $50 per household.
17. Assumptions:
a. Additional gross sales to rural sector equal additional sector familial purchases 
plus Commerce/Transport value added, less $40 million rural-rural.
b. Sales to Micro-Small Industry equal wages plus one half other sectoral value added. 
Sales to commercialised Zonas Verdes and to the artisanalsector = value added. 
(Wages = 25,000 X $600 = $15,000,000; Artisanal Value Added 10,000 X $500 = 
$5,000,000; Zonas Verdes commercialised Value Added $7,000,000; Other Value added 
$20,000,00 0.)
c. Sales to public service wage earners equal wages ($12,500,000).
d. Rural sales reduced by 3 3 V a% for transport/rural commerce content; urban by 5% for 
inputs into urban transport/commerce.
e. Value added estimated at 65% of (a + b) reduced by c. Allows 20% operating and 
spares imports, 2|% purchases from rural sector, 12|% taxes (actual collection of 
turnover taxes licenses not nominal amount due).
f. Guesstimate of $25 million exports (fob) at 60% value added. The GDP here is value 













18. Assumes small urban infrastructure (e.g. drainage, small scale irrigation, roads, 
canisa site and service plot preparation, latrines) and time saving from closer water 
and health services empowers increase of 10,000 tonnes self-provisioning food 
($100/tonne) and 25,000 tonnes commercialised food ($200/tonne) plus $2 million fuel, 
building materials, other non-food crops.
19. User contribution in labour, food, materials to service cost. (Cash payments assumed 
to be $6 million.)
20. This is a relatively low estimate because first round on wage incomes has already been 
taken into account.
21. Does not include large enterprise, Urban Rehabilitation and other Heavy Infrastructure
(e.g. Railways and Ports) projects not within Reconstrucao.
22. Not directly comparable to present GDP estimates. These seriously underestimate
current price GDP by using massively too low domestic price levels and inflation rates
and very incomplete coverage of co-op, informal and private enterprise commercial 
agriculture and of small scale and artisanal urban production of goods and services 
which are only partly offset by massive overestimation of households self-provisioning 
(subsistence) agricultural output.
Table 6
Reconstrucao Fiscal Impact 1998/99 




(20% Additional Commercialised GDP)2 50,500 74,500 125,000
Cash Contributions To Basic
Service Costs 6,000 12,500 18,500
TOTAL 56,000 87,000 143,000
B. Expenditure
Basic Services3
Wages 10,000 30,000 40,000
Other 10,000 30,000 40,000
Small Scale Infrastructure4
Wages 5,000 25,000 30,000
Other 7,500 37,500 45,000
Interim Food Security5 7,500 - 7, 500
Continued Artisanal/Small Ent­
erprise Enabling8 7,500 7, 500 15,000
Gross Additional Expenditure 47,500 130,000 177,500
Less:
User Contribution In
Goods/Labour' 1,500 5,000 6,500
Reduction Military Expenditure8'9 f12,500] (37,500) 50,000
Total Offsets 14,000 42,500 56,500
Net Additional Expenditure 33,500 87,500 106,000
C. Net Fiscal Gain (Cost) 23,000 (500) 22,500
Notes:
1. 1991 Prices except assumes real minimum salario moves to $40 minimum efficiency level.
2. Shorthand estimate roughly comparable to other serious tax effort primarily agrarian
Sub-Saharan African economies, e.g. Tanzania. By definition excludes Household Self- 
Provisioning from tax base.
3. Assumes continued build-up beyond 1997/98 levels.
4. Assumes continued run-down from 1995/96 peak levels as rehabilitation backlog reduced.
5. Continued run-down as real minimum wage recovery reduces numbers covered.
6. Training and Services - Loan Funds assumed by 1998/99 to have become largely revolving 
with additional investment in them on subsequent Developmento capital account.
7. See Table 5.
8. Urban (25%), Rural (75%) arbitrary - based on projected 1998/99 population division.
9. See Table 4 - Note 5.
Table 7





TOTAL Additional Exports 140,500
Imports
Urban Goods Inputs'1 55,000
Rural Goods Inputs5 NA
Transport5 50,000
Government Services' 50,500




NET Additional Imports 135,000
NET Balance Improvement + 5,000
Notes:
1. Excludes grant, loan items. Specifically excludes reductions in food 
aid which affects Import/Export sides equally. (See Table 9.)
2. $96,250,000 farmgate plus $19,250,000 (20%) transport/commerce to fob.
3. See Table 5 - Note 17.
4. 20% of Gross Sales. (See Table 5 - Note 17.)
5. Included in Urban Goods Sales.
6. Rough estimate fuel, spares, replacement lorries.
7. 75% Non Wage spending on Basic Services, Small Scale Infrastructure 
from Table 6. Dominated by drugs and other medical supplies and
paper/textbooks.
8. Rough implicit assumption is that net military savings include $25,000
on items other than wages/rations/local purchases. Gross savings on 
the domestic purchases rations and wages items from Demobilascao should 
be of the order of $30,000 but net will be substantially lower because
of improved pay/rations/uniforms needed to achieve professionalism in
20,000 to 25,000 professional army post Demobilascao.
Table 8
Food (im) Balance — Reconstrucao Impact 
(000 tonnes grain equivalent)
1990/91 1988/89
Population In Mozambique1 12,500,000 18,250,000
Food Requirement2 4, 500,000 (100%) 6,570,000 (100%)
Domestic Production3 2,750,000 (61%) 5,710,000 (87%)

































Food Deficit 1,125,000 (25%) 460,000 (7%)
Urban/Rural Breakdown5 Urban Rural Urban Rural
Population In
Mozambique 3,000,000 9,500,000 4,500,000 13,750,000
Food Requirement5 1,080,000 3,420,000 1,620,000 4,950,000









( - ) 
(4,625,000)




















1. The official United Nations/Government of Mozambique projection of 16,000,000 
is clearly wrong. Subtractions include 1,500,000 refugees and 1,000,000 excess 
deaths resulting from war. Preliminary data in 1991 suggested a total 
population of 12,500,000. 1988/89 assumes return of 1,500,000 refugees plus a 
30% increase on the base population of 14,000,000, or about 3% a year.
2. Production level required assumed to be 360 kilos grain equivalent per year 
based on 800 grammes per day consumption requirement adjusted to allow for 20% 
loss from harvest (or import) to consumption.
3. This figure is not a complete estimate. Additions resulting from programmes by
government and enterprises outside Reconstrucao (e.g. competent training and 
extension in both large and small scale irrigation areas, commercial farm food 
output expansion) are not included. These could amount to perhaps 200,000 to
250,000 tonnes reducing the deficit by half to 3% to 4% of total requirement. 
That does not mean only 3% to 4% of households (7% on Table 8 figures) have
less than fully adequate food supplies because of inequality in distribution.
However, it should more than halve severe malnutrition from over 20% to 8% to 
10%.
4. Estimates include all marketed output-local trade, private, co-op not only 
officially recorded flows.
5. 1990/91 may understate commercial imports via informal (legal apart from 
customs/turnover tax evasion) imports from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Malawi.
6. Assumes Urban population 4,500,000 in 1988/89 and Rural 13,750,000. Implicit 
urban population growth rate 7%.
7. 1990/91 deficit levels are plausible given known malnutrition data. 1989/90 
estimate of slightly poorer urban than rural nutrition are not implausible;
e.g. they probably parallel actual Tanzanian reality. They parallel estimates 
in Table 9 suggesting slightly higher proportions of absolute poverty (not 
numbers of absolutely poor people) in urban than in rural areas. Again this 
appears congruent with the present situation in Tanzania because while average 
urban household income is higher so too is inequality in food consumption and 
income. However, both differences are clearly within the margins of error of 
the projections.
Table 9
Absolute Poverty Reduction From Reconstrucao
Category1 1990/91 1998/99
Urban2 50% 27|%
■ Related To Low Wages3 (20%) (5%)
■ Related To Low Labour 
Power of Household
plus Unemployment4 (30%) (22i%)
Rural 71% 22 j%
■ Of Livelihood Rehab- 
iliation Programme
Households5 (90%) (25%)
■ Of Other Households6 (30%) (20%)
TOTAL7 65% 24%
Notes;
1. See Table 5 - Note 9 for Absolute Poverty Line Estimates.
2. The percentages are of total urban absolutely poor households not of 
sub-population groups absolute poverty percentages.
3. Reduction from raising minimum real salario to $40 (at or approaching 
minimum efficiency level).
4. Reduction from retraining; higher productivity employment in "informal" 
as well as recorded sector; higher productivity employment artisanal, 
Zonas Verdes producers plus reduction in open unemployment (about 4% of 
potentially economically active persons in 1991).
5. See Table 5 - Section A and Note 9. Average income is perhaps 10% 
below absolute poverty line. This implies 20% to 30% of households 
would be below it depending on household income inequality.
6. Benefits from spin-off GDP impact noted in Table 5 - Section B and Note
10. Likely to be reduced further by rural output increases not related 
to Reconstrucao.
7. Because of parallel non-Reconstrucao generated economic recovery - both 
urban and rural - the actual 1989/90 absolute poverty outcome should be 
marginally to modestly better than these projections.
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